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The European experience 




29 April 2010 
he key question for European policy-makers and financial markets alike is now whether 
“Greece can make it” (Burda, 2010). 
There is consensus that Greece must cut its deficit by about 10-12% of GDP in order to put the 
country’s public finances back to a sustainable path (see Gros & Alcidi, 2010). The Greek government 
has promised that it will achieve this adjustment, but is this promise credible in the light of the 
experience in the EU? Our results suggest that an adjustment of this size is not without precedent, but 
it will probably take at least five years, and, even if the headline goal is reached, it might still leave the 
country in a highly unstable position. 
What is the European experience? 
Table 1 shows the 12 largest fiscal adjustments observed over the last decades in the EU. We 
concentrate on the cyclically adjusted primary balance as the main metric because it provides a better 
measure of the adjustment effort of the country by correcting adjustments that were achieved to a large 
extent through the operation of the fiscal multipliers (e.g. Sweden). The data we use are those 
published by the European Commission (which differs somewhat from the OECD data widely used in 
financial market commentaries (see, for instance, Boone et al., 2010)). 
Inspection of Table 1 shows that at first sight there should be no problem. Greece has already achieved 
an adjustment of the size required today, namely in the early 1990s (then the improvement in the 
primary balance was almost 11% of GDP over five years). Other EU countries, namely Denmark, 
Sweden and Italy, have come close in terms of the overall adjustment. Others (Portugal, Finland and 
Belgium) would not be far behind with adjustments totalling about 8-9% of GDP. 
This seems to suggest that, even if painful, a fiscal adjustment of 10% of GDP is (or rather has been in 
the past) possible. 
But how? There are interesting differences in the way the fiscal adjustment was achieved (i.e. through 
cuts in spending or increases in taxes) and in the extent to which debt was actually stabilised. 
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Table 1. Primary balance adjustment 
Country 
Primary balance 




adjustment (% GDP)  
PB adjustment, 
per year (% GDP) 
Denmark 1982-86  4  -1.3  10.0  2.5 
Greece 1989-94  5  -6.0  10.8  2.2 
Sweden 1993-98  5  -2.5  9.0  1.8 
Ireland 1985-89  4  -0.9  5.9  1.5 
Portugal 1986-80  6  -5.8  8.2  1.4 
Italy 1989-97  8  -3.3  10.4  1.3 
UK 1993-99  6  -3.6  7.4  1.2 
Finland 1992-2000  8  0  8.2  1.0 
France 1993-97  4  -2.4 3.6  0.9 
Belgium 1981-90  9  -4.3  8.1  0.9 
Austria 1995-2001  6  -1.5  4.7  0.8 
Netherlands 1990-2000  10  -0.8  4.5  0.4 
Note: Primary balance figures are adjusted for the cyclical component (adjustment based on GDP trend). 
Source: European Commission (AMECO) and authors’ calculations.  
Expenditure cuts versus tax increases 
Table 2 shows that in the Mediterranean countries (Greece, Portugal and Italy) the adjustment tends to 
occur through increases in government revenue, with small, if any, cuts on the expenditure side. This 
is in stark contrast with most other countries, and even more markedly with the Nordic ones, where the 
corrections tend to be based on large reductions in government expenditure. France qualifies on this 
account as a member of the ‘Club Med’, since about 71% of its adjustment in the 1990s (total ‘only’ of 
3.6% of GDP, see Table 1 above) was achieved through revenue increases. 





% of total PB 
adjustment through 
increase in revenue 
% of total primary balance 
adjustment through cut in 
expenditure 
Portugal 1986-80  110.6  -10.6* 
Italy 1989-97  85.3  14.7 
Greece 1989-94  84.0  16.0 
France 1993-97  70.7  29.3 
Denmark 1982-86  28.2  71.8 
UK 1993-99  20.0  80.0 
Austria 1995-2001  12.2  87.8 
Belgium 1981-90  1.8  98.2 
Sweden 1993-98  -25.7*  125.7 
Ireland 1985-89  -46.9  146.9 
Finland 1992-2000  -63.4  163.4 
Netherlands 1990-2000  -89.1  189.1 
*Negative sign implies that expenditure increased. 
Source: European Commission (AMECO) and authors’ calculations. Note: General Government revenue and 
expenditure figures are adjusted for the cyclical component (adjustment based on GDP trend). 
Stabilisation of the debt to GDP ratio 
The goal of the large fiscal adjustments is to make public finances sustainable. However, as Table 3 
shows, this goal was rarely achieved, especially if the primary balance was in large deficit at the 
beginning of the adjustment process.  
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For example, as shown in the first row of Table 3, during the 10 years of its fiscal adjustment, 
Belgium’s gross debt ratio increased by more than by 50 percentage points of GDP. Something similar 
happened during the adjustments in Greece, Portugal and Italy, where the debt-to-GDP ratio continued 
to increase by more than 20 percentage points of GDP. This implies that if Greece were to repeat over 
the next few years its performance during the early 1990s, it would end the adjustment process with a 
debt ratio of over 150% of GDP. 
However, the data also suggest that the adjustment periods considered did at least succeed in 
stabilising, or nearly stabilising, the debt ratio in most countries (it continued to increase, by a small 
amount, only in Belgium and Greece). 
The case of Italy is exceptional; debt kept increasing at a fast pace during the time of the big 
correction and then, in the following years, a significant shift took place as the effect of a lower 
interest rate materialised. 










debt (% GDP) 
Durable? Change 
in debt, 5 years 
after (% GDP) 
Belgium 1981-90  74.1  na  51.6  4.2 
Greece 1989-94  64.2 7.5  32.1  4.0 
Portugal 1986-80  30.5  na  28.2  -1.2 
Italy 1989-97  93.1  3.9  25.0  -12.4 
France 1993-97  46.5  0.2  13.0  -0.5 
Finland 1992-2000  40.0  1.5  3.8  -2.0 
Denmark 1982-86  64.5  na  2.0  -3.7 
Sweden 1993-98  69.9  0.9  -0.9  -16.8 
UK 1993-99  44.5  1.0  -0.9  -3.1 
Austria 1995-2001  68.3  -0.3  -1.3  -4.8 
Ireland 1985-89  100.7  na  -1.3  -10.7 
Netherlands 1990-2000  76.8  0.9  -23.1  -2.0 
Source: European Commission (AMECO) and authors’ calculations. Note: Implicit interest rate (interest paid as 
% of gross debt) spread is the difference between the average implicit interest rate of the country and the 
German average over the same time period. 
Concluding remarks 
Two patterns emerge from this brief review: 
•  Fiscal adjustments of the size now required by Greece (and probably soon by Portugal and 
Spain) have been possible in the past. 
•  Adjustments of this size require time, typically at least five years; and the debt-to-GDP ratio 
keeps on increasing during the adjustment process. 
For Greece, the historical precedent suggests that a fiscal adjustment of 10 percentage points of GDP 
ought to be possible. But it might be based only on tax increases without reductions in expenditure, 
which would likely leave the debt-to-GDP ratio at such a high level (150% of GDP) that the country 
would be excluded from financial markets for a long time. 
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